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Problem area 
Safety professionals are 
constantly in the process of 
assessing the safety risk of new 
aviation systems and supporting 
the identification of mitigating 
measures, which may be 
necessary to reach appropriate 
future safety targets. Diagnostic 
tools and methods are under 
development to monitor the 
overall health of the aviation 
system as it adapts to both 
planned and unplanned 
disruptive technologies and 
operational models that may be 
driven by market forces.  
However, prognostic safety 
analyses are required to 
anticipate the safety impacts of 
changes internal and external to 
the aviation system that are 
beyond the near-term planning 
horizon. Industry and 
government leaders have both 
an ethical and engineering 
responsibility to safely manage 
changes out in the future. 
 
Description of work 
This paper presents an 
integrated approach to 
prognostic hazard identification 
employing structured 
brainstorming to identify 
functionally imaginable and 
unimaginable hazards and 
systematic identification of 
hazards due to predicted 
changes that will impact aviation 
in the distant future. This 
method has been co-developed 
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Application of the method to 
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Foreknowledge of these hazards 
will ensure that aviation safety 
research is responsive and 
relevant to emerging safety 
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Abstract  
Safety professionals are constantly in the 
process of assessing the safety risk of new 
aviation systems and supporting the 
identification of mitigating measures, which 
may be necessary to reach appropriate future 
safety targets.  Diagnostic tools and methods 
are under development to monitor the overall 
health of the aviation system as it adapts to both 
planned and unplanned disruptive technologies 
and operational models that may be driven by 
market forces.  However, prognostic safety 
analyses are required to anticipate the safety 
impacts of changes internal and external to the 
aviation system that are beyond the near-term 
planning horizon.   Industry and government 
leaders have both an ethical and engineering 
responsibility to safely manage changes out in 
the future.  This paper presents an integrated 
approach to prognostic hazard identification 
employing structured brainstorming to identify 
functionally imaginable and unimaginable 
hazards and systematic identification of hazards 
due to predicted changes that will impact 
aviation in the distant future.  This method will 
generate a set of safety hazards that can serve 
as input to traditional safety analysis.  This 
method has been co-developed by NLR, DFS, 
and the ECAST/ESSI Future Aviation Safety 
Team (FAST). 
1 Introduction  
Traditional approaches to hazard identification 
generate a set of hazards within the scope of the 
domain of the particular concept of operation or 
technology system of interest.  These 
approaches are well developed and yield a 
robust set of hazards usable for conceived 
design purposes.  However, they typically do 
not identify hazards associated with human 
operators of digital, electro-mechanical, and 
process systems used in new and novel ways, 
beyond the level of human error.  Since this 
could lead to a gross underestimation of the risk 
associated with such new operations, there is a 
need to include hazards that are not easily 
conceived and imagined using traditional 
approaches.  This paper presents a hybrid 
method for identifying additional hazards using 
structured brainstorming by domain experts 
coupled with a systematic assessment of the 
contextual factors present either within or 
external to the future operational setting.  This 
hybrid approach combines the best features of 
free-form brainstorming by subject-matter 
experts (SME) and a multi-disciplinary 
approach to hazard identification across eleven 
functional domains relevant to aviation. 
The organization of this paper is as 
follows: Section 2 outlines the traditional 
approaches to hazard identification. Section 3 
describes a pure brainstorming approach to 
hazard identification. Section 4 gives a general 
introduction to the FAST method, restricted to 
the hazard identification part. Section 5 explains 
why and how the FAST method enriches the 
brainstorming approach to hazard identification 
by systematic consideration of future 
developments.  Section 6 provides conclusions. 
2 Traditional Approaches To Hazard 
Identification  
The first generation of hazard identification is 
the functional approach, well known from 
system engineering and for example employed 
in the Guidelines for approval of the provision 
and use of air traffic services supported by data 
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communications [5].  In this approach, first the 
service characteristics, functions and procedures 
of air traffic services are determined. Next, 
hazards are identified considering: 
• Loss or unavailability of information; 
• Misleading information; and 
• Whether or not hazards involving lost, 
unavailable or misleading information 
are detected. 
Although this establishes a systematic approach 
to identify hazards from a functional failure 
point of view, not all hazards are identified in 
this way: 
• There may be hazards associated with 
systems functioning as designed. 
Controllers might become overly reliant 
on a well-functioning alerting system. 
One could consider these phenomena as 
causes for failing to separate aircraft, but 
it is unlikely to imagine such hazards 
when starting from failures; 
There may be hazards not or only 
remotely associated with failures of 
services. Situational awareness 
differences could in hindsight be 
represented as such failures but they are 
so rich in their possible appearances that 
they are very hard to identify 
exhaustively in that way; and 
• There may be implicit functions relevant 
for safety only recognized after failure. 
Analyses performed for runway crossing 
operations e.g. indicate the importance 
to protect the runway against “lost” 
pilots who do not even have the 
intention to cross, see [1] and [4]. 
Indeed, a complete functional 
description may be excessively complex. 
Hazards that are not identified by means of the 
functional approach are referred to as 
“functionally unimaginable” or, briefly, 
unimaginable hazards.  Fig. 1 contrasts the 
domain of functional hazards with universe of 
all possible hazards. 
The second generation hazard identification 
method “HAZOP” (Hazard and Operability 
study, see for instance [10]) identifies and 
analyzes hazards with operational experts.  
HAZOP involves brainstorming along 
keywords, and an advantage above the 
functional approach is that it creates space for 
the identification of functionally unimaginable 
hazards. In addition to hazard identification, 
HAZOP sessions are also used to assess safety 
risks and to identify potential solutions for 
hazards.  Unfortunately, as will be pointed out, 
assessment and solution activities themselves 
disturb the identification process, such that 
some hazards are left unidentified.  Another 
complication is that, potential solutions may 
introduce new hazards. 
 
Fig. 1.  Subset of Functional Hazards within Set 
of All Possible Hazards for a Certain Operation 
3 A brainstorming method to identify 
unimaginable hazards 
This section elaborates a third generation hazard 
identification approach involving pure 
brainstorming with operational experts (air 
traffic controllers and pilots). Guidelines for this 
approach have been developed at NLR on the 
basis of a large number of safety risk analyses 
of air traffic operations, have been published in 
[2]-[4], and have been incorporated in [6]. 
3.1 What is a hazard? 
Instead of services, functions and failures, the 
starting point of the hazard identification is the 
safety of the operation: a hazard is anything that 
might negatively influence the operation’s 
safety. In other words, the notion of hazard is 
defined in relation to safety, which makes it a 
much more general notion than failures or 
Hazards identified with 
functional analysis Domain of all 
possible hazards 
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 “something going wrong”, which are rather 
related to reliability. At this stage in the safety 
risk analysis, the risk and the underlying 
severities and frequencies associated with a 
hazard do not play a role yet. 
3.2 Basic rules of hazard identification 
brainstorming 
Identifying as many hazards as possible is a 
prerequisite for a safety risk analysis: hazards 
left unidentified are not analyzed and lead to an 
overly optimistic perspective on the risk of the 
operation considered. From a more general 
brainstorming context, the basic brainstorming 
rule “quantity breeds quality” is known [11]. 
Therefore, the goal of the hazard identification 
step is to obtain as many hazards applicable to 
the operation as possible. A productive 
brainstorm is not an indication of an unsafe 
operation: the safety risk of the hazards is still to 
be analyzed. Moreover, if there are hazards 
pointing towards flaws in the operation, it is 
better to know them early than late. The second 
basic rule of brainstorming is that criticism and 
analysis are forbidden during the sessions. This 
rule is also motivated from cognitive science 
[11]. Criticism easily kills the open atmosphere 
necessary for productive brainstorming. 
Identified hazards that seem unimportant to 
somebody must not be filtered out in the hazard 
identification; safety risk is to be assessed in a 
later stage of the analysis cycle. All time should 
be used for generating hazards. It is known from 
experience that analysis is time-consuming – 
analyzing a single hazard may well take much 
more than a session – and should be performed 
by safety risk analysts. 
3.3 Participants of a hazard identification 
brainstorm 
A suitable group of participants for a hazard 
identification brainstorming session consists of: 
• Operational experts (a controller and a 
pilot); 
• A moderator; 
• Somebody taking notes; 
• A safety analyst (preferably coinciding 
with the moderator); and 
• If the developed operation is complex, 
an expert on the operation (preferably 
coinciding with the person taking notes). 
Guidelines for selecting a controller and pilot 
for the brainstorms are: 
• The operational experts have NOT 
otherwise been involved in the 
development of the operation; 
• The operational experts must be able and 
willing to play devil’s advocates; 
• The kind of controller (area, approach, 
tower or ground control) should match 
the operational scope of the brainstorm; 
• Vary with the kind of pilots (heavy, 
medium, light; scheduled, charter; 
foreign, home carrier) if there are more 
brainstorms; and 
• Current expertise is preferable over past 
experience. 
The moderator’s task is to make the 
brainstorming session as productive as possible. 
This is complex as it involves strictly watching 
the basic rules of brainstorming, making short 
notes of the identified hazards on a flip chart or 
via a beamer, and subtly steering the hazard 
identification process along the many 
dimensions of the operation and possible kinds 
of hazards. Preferably, moderation is done by a 
safety analyst involved in the analysis. 
Especially if the brainstorm is a one-time 
opportunity, experience and background in 
moderating brainstorm sessions, as well as 
extensive preparation, is important. 
Somebody else than the moderator has to make 
more detailed notes of the hazards identified, as 
a starting point of the minutes of the session. 
 If the operation is complex, it is good to 
have an expert give a quick operational 
oversight presentation (at most half an hour) and 
answer questions about it. It would be good if 
the expert on the operation takes notes. 
 It is important that a safety analyst of the 
project is present at the brainstorming session. 
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(S)he is the most suitable person to make sure 
that the brainstorm delivers what the rest of the 
analysis needs. If possible, the safety analyst 
and moderator should coincide, as the 
moderator is highly influential with respect to 
the outcome of the brainstorm. This will also 
reduce the amount of preparation the moderator 
needs. A “blank” moderator will have to learn 
many safety issues that are basic to a safety 
analyst involved in the analysis. An alternative 
way to keep the number of participants minimal 
would be to have the safety analyst take notes.
 Experience has indicated that the 
aforementioned group of four to six people is 
more than adequate for brainstorming – it 
should rather be considered as a maximal than a 
minimal group! The reason for this is that 
controllers and pilots are the main sources of 
hazards and adding more people to the group 
will rather hamper than help these operational 
experts. 
More generally, it is well-known in 
cognitive science [11] that the productivity of 
brainstorming groups generally does not grow 
proportionally with the number of participants. 
As a matter of fact, there are only a few special 
settings in which the productivity of a 
brainstorming group surpasses or even equals 
that of situation where the participants would 
brainstorm alone! For this reason it is advised 
not to have the project leader participate in the 
brainstorm: such a session flourishes with a 
minimal set of persons with necessary expertise 
(controller and pilot) and skills (moderator). 
More participants can even severely damage the 
brainstorm,  e.g. in case some of the additional 
people are very talkative while the operational 
experts are shy or when people feel they cannot 
speak openly due to presence of superiors – 
group composition is of crucial influence. 
3.4 Preparing a hazard identification 
brainstorm 
Active controllers and pilots have busy 
schedules and their time is precious, hence their 
participation should be arranged long before the 
session. Recognition of the project’s importance 
by the employing air traffic service provider or 
airline is important for obtaining operational 
expert involvement.    
 As the operational experts (controller 
and pilot) must not be involved in the 
development of the operation, they have to be 
informed about the operation in order to identify 
its hazards. In view of their busy schedules, the 
best way to do that is to start the session with a 
short overview presentation. This should cover 
all the aspects of the operation listed below, but 
not in a detailed way: 
• The objective of the developed 
operation; 
• Operational context (geometrical 
description, timeframe and traffic 
characteristics); 
• Human roles and responsibilities (Air 
Traffic Control (ATC) and pilot point of 
view); 
• Procedures (ATC and pilot point of 
view); and 
• Technical systems (communication, 
navigation and surveillance). 
Pictures with e.g. airspace/airport layout, in- and 
outbound routes, and schematic diagrams often 
work better than a lot of text.  
The moderator should prepare a 
presentation (of at most ten minutes) 
introducing hazard identification brainstorming: 
• What is a hazard? 
• The goal of brainstorming; 
• The basic rules; and 
• The way of working. 
The moderator should also prepare hazard 
categorizations according to: 
• Operational aspects; 
• Potential conflict types conceivable in 
the operation at hand (such as conflicts 
between two departures, between a 
taxiing aircraft and a vehicle, et cetera); 
and 
• Flight phases and combinations of flight 
phases in possible conflict situations. 
In the preparation, the moderator should 
populate these categorizations with hazards 
using: 
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 • Preliminary scoping brainstorms 
(performed individually, or by 
moderator and analyst); and 
• Hazard and incident/accident databases 
and relevant literature. 
It is not advisable to restrict preliminary scoping 
brainstorms to functional hazards only: such 
restrictions almost inevitably induce similar 
restrictions in the output of the main brainstorm. 
3.5 Performing a hazard identification 
brainstorm 
Tasks of the moderator during hazard 
identification brainstorming are: 
• Take strict care that the basic rules of 
brainstorming are respected (as many 
hazards as possible and no 
analysis/criticism); 
• Make short notes of the mentioned 
hazards on the flip over using the format 
“hazard id (number) and short 
description” and watch that hazards have 
a correct and common interpretation; 
• Take subtly care that “all” aspects of the 
operation and possible hazard categories 
are covered by pointing to such aspects 
(rather than specific hazards), especially 
if the identification process gets stuck in 
specific subsets of the space of all 
hazards; and 
• Apply short breaks before productivity 
drops significantly, such that the 
participants can free their memory. 
3.6 Comparing functional and brainstorming 
approach  
Fig. 2 gives an impression how hazards 
identified with the functional and the pure 
brainstorming approach relate [2], [1] and [4].
 The figure indicates that the functional 
approach explores a limited part (the grey oval 
at the left side of the large white oval) of the set 
of all hazards in a rather dense way, and that the 
pure brainstorming approach covers more 
various parts (the smaller dotted ovals). Hence it 
is useful to perform both the pure brainstorming 
and the functional approach to hazard 
identification, the correct order being: first the 
brainstorming and then the functional approach, 
especially when the same operational experts 
are involved. However, even by applying both 
approaches one may not expect to be 
exhaustive. 
3.7 After the brainstorm session 
The note taker works out and distributes the 
hazard list among the participants asking to 
check and correct or complement if necessary – 
hazards conceived after the brainstorm are 
welcome, too. The moderator and safety analyst 
check how effective the brainstorm has been: 
• Have all prepared operational aspects, 
conflict types and hazard categories been 
covered? 
• Have hazards necessitating new conflict 
types and hazard categories been 
identified? If not, the moderator has 
either prepared extremely well, or, more 
probably, restricted the brainstorm too 
much to his prepared material; 
Hazards identified by brainstorm session 
Functionally unimaginable hazards 
Hazards identified by functional approach 
All hazards associated with an operation 
Fig. 2. Subset of functional and pure 
brainstorming hazards 
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• Have most hazards identified in the 
preparation been re-identified during the 
brainstorm? and 
• Is a significant percentage of hazards 
unimaginable to the moderator and 
safety analyst? 
Based on this evaluation, it may be necessary to 
have additional brainstorms. 
4 Prognostic Hazard Identification by the 
Future Aviation Safety Team (FAST) 
The European Strategic Safety Initiative (ESSI) 
operating under the aegis of the European 
Aviation Safety Agency (EASA) chartered the 
FAST to identify “future hazards and at 
reducing risks arising from future system 
changes either within or outside the aviation 
domain” [8].    
 Many prognostic hazard discovery 
processes exist today.  For instance, during the 
design of a new airplane, a manufacturer will 
spend a substantial amount of engineering effort 
to identify previously unknown hazards that 
may be unique to that new design.  Building on 
past experience, using expert understanding of 
the proposed design, as well as expert 
conjecture regarding associated hazards, the 
manufacturer will identify hazards, and then 
work to eliminate, avoid or mitigate those 
hazards in the final design. 
4.1 The FAST Process, Concentrating on the 
Concept of Areas of Change 
FAST augments existing hazard identification 
techniques by taking into account an inventory 
of future changes within and external to the 
aviation system. Future changes may take the 
form of unintended evolutionary or 
revolutionary developments.  They may also be 
deliberately planned with the intent of achieving 
specific results.  Changes affecting the aviation 
system will usually take the form of technology 
infusions, organizational or business model 
changes and/or regulatory modifications and 
updates.  Such “Areas of Change” are the future 
backdrop, context or milieu in which proposed 
new concepts, technologies and procedures will 
be immersed. FAST utilizes these Areas of 
Change to systematically assess the 
accumulation of interactions that can create new 
failures or increase the severity or likelihood of 
existing ones.  Fig. 3 illustrates the process. 
4.2 Development of the List of Areas of 
Change 
Members of FAST, in concert with regulation 
authorities, expert advice, and input from 
interested parties, first developed a list of Areas 
of Change during a series of workshops hosted 
by EUROCONTROL in 1999. 
 The FAST has cataloged approximately 
220 change phenomena that will affect the 
future aviation system in one way or the other.  
These phenomena are categorized using the 
domains listed below:  
• Aircraft; 
• Maintenance, Repairs, and Overhaul 
Operations; 
• Crew; 
• Passenger; 
• Organization; 
• Authority; 
• Air Navigation Services; 
• Airport; 
• Environment; and 
• Space Operations. 
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 The FAST continuously solicits submission of 
new, candidate Areas of Change affecting the 
future aviation system.  Submission of new 
AoC’s should be made to Rudi den Hertog, 
Chief Engineer, Fokker Services, FAST Co-
chair, rudi.denhertog@stork.com. 
 Plans are in place to combine FAST 
AoC’s with other sources of future safety 
concerns, for instance with those emerging from 
the Issue Analysis Team within the Joint 
Implementation Measurement Data Analysis 
Team (JIMDAT).  The JIMDAT reports directly 
to the U.S-based Commercial Aviation Safety 
Team (CAST). 
4.3 Evolution and Interaction of the Areas of 
Change 
An important feature of the FAST method is 
that it considers that several possible futures 
may interact with the future under study, 
producing unanticipated hazards.  
 Figure 4 illustrates the concept of how 
Areas of Change ebb and flow with time and 
how different futures are composed of different 
sets of Areas of Change.  Areas of Change are 
the future backdrop, context or milieu in which 
proposed new concepts, technologies and 
procedures will be immersed. For instance, the 
future will likely feature the gradual phase out 
of early-generation jet transports (AoC “a”) 
coupled with the advent of fleets of micro-jet 
personal aircraft (AoC “l”).  
 Figure 5 illustrates the eleven categories 
of domains that potentially influence the safety 
of future concepts of operation.  It also 
illustrates how AoC’s in each of these 
categories interact within and among the 
categories.     
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Fig. 5. Interaction Within and Among Areas of Change 
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 4.4 Using the Areas of Change in Hazard 
Identification 
At the stage of the hazard identification process, 
the AoC’s are used as systematic prompts by the 
analysis team.  Their job is to determine how 
the AoC’s may affect the safety and genesis of 
hazards of the future system under 
consideration.  Using the AoC’s, the FAST 
method recommends that the hazard-analysis 
team ask the following key questions with 
respect to the system of interest: 
• Does this AoC increase the likelihood of 
well-understood current hazards that will 
exist in the Future? 
• Does this AoC create new hazards 
synergistically with other AoC's or with 
the Future that would not have come into 
being without the presence of the AoC?  
• Does this AoC increase the subjective 
likelihood of Future hazards to an 
unacceptable level? 
• Does this AoC create increased potential 
for human error, procedural non-
compliance or equipment failure? 
• Does this AoC decrease the resilience of 
the projected safety system? 
• Does this AoC render the projected 
safety systems more brittle to off-
nominal conditions? 
• Does this AoC decrease safety levels 
during non-normal or emergency 
operations within the projected Future? 
• What current and projected safety 
assurance measures within the Future 
may be lost or rendered ineffective as a 
result of this AoC? 
• Does this AoC require creation of new 
control measures for critical aspects of 
the Future?  Definition:  A control 
measure is an action or procedure that 
will reduce, prevent or eliminate a 
potential hazard. 
• Does this AoC adversely affect control 
measures, critical control points or 
critical limits?  Definitions:  A critical 
control point is a step at which a control 
measure is applied.  A control limit is a 
maximum and/or minimum value for 
controlling a physical parameter. 
• Will this AoC create new conditions that 
are currently not part of the design 
assumptions for the Future systems and 
procedures? 
• Will this AoC result in decreased skill 
levels and judgment among operators of 
Future systems? 
5. How FAST enriches hazard identification 
by systematic consideration of future 
developments 
The first fundamental notion of this paper is that 
while a traditional, i.e. functional, approach to 
hazard identification yields a subset of all 
hazards associated with an operation, it leaves 
some important hazards unidentified.  The pure 
brainstorm technique developed by NLR will 
identify hazards outside the range of the 
functional approach (and will duplicate some as 
well).      
 To address the second fundamental 
notion of this paper, let us assume that any 
possible hazard affecting aviation can be 
associated to one of the eleven aviation system 
domains categorized by the FAST and shown in 
Fig. 5.  This then results in the pie-shaped 
domains in the oval depicted in Fig. 6 below. 
Systematic consideration of the 220+ 
FAST AoC’s via the eleven categories shown 
above will extend the scope of the hazard 
identification to include these changes and this 
will direct explicit attention to threats caused by 
these areas of changes that have not been 
considered systematically with the functional 
approach or the structured brainstorming 
approach.   
The combined approach works as 
follows: 
1. Structured brainstorming “discovers” 
certain “unimaginable” hazards not 
readily identified using the functional 
approach.  These hazards are of 
necessity limited in scope due to the 
range of expertise of the domain experts 
participating in the exercise. 
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2. Hazard identification is then augmented 
by systematic consideration of the 
contextual factors within each of the 
eleven categories of all-possible hazards.  
Consideration is also given to interaction 
of hazards within specific categories as 
well as among and across the various 
categories. 
The expected end result is that application of a 
functional approach plus NLR brainstorm plus 
the FAST method  (based on AoC’s) will 
identify a more complete set of hazards and 
cross-domain interactions than any one method 
will on its own: 
• The functional approach will densely 
cover hazards directly associated with 
functional failures of the operation 
considered. 
• The brainstorming approach will add 
hazards of the considered operation less 
or not associated with functional 
failures. 
• The FAST approach to hazard 
identification will in addition yield 
hazards associated with “perturbations” 
of the considered operation along the 
AoC’s. 
The additional hazards identified using the 
FAST AoC’s in each of these categories as 
prompts will add significant value to traditional 
hazard-identification techniques.  An impression 
of the additional hazards identified is given in 
Fig. 7.  There will be some inevitable overlap 
between hazards identified by the respective 
methods. 
6. Conclusion 
This paper describes a hazard identification 
methodology that will help reveal hazards not 
typically uncovered by traditional “functional” 
approaches to hazard identification.  Its key 
elements are structured brainstorming by 
aviation subject-matter experts coupled with an 
systematic identification of additional hazards 
of a proposed aviation “future” in light of the 
contextual factors – so-called Areas of Change – 
that will be present at the time of development 
and deployment.  Application of the method 
outlined in this paper to future concepts of 
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Fig. 6. Eleven Categories of the Universe of All-Possible Hazards 
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 operation will identify emergent hazards.  
Foreknowledge of these hazards will ensure that 
aviation safety research is responsive and 
relevant to emerging safety risks.  The aviation 
community must not focus solely on safety 
problems of the past or the risks of near-term 
system deployments.  It must anticipate and 
prepare for the hazards of the emergent future. 
New vehicles, operational paradigms, 
and business models will introduce novel safety 
risks into the airspace system.  Potentially, the 
most important issue for air transportation in the 
future is how to safely integrate the air-, ground- 
and space-based aviation support systems with 
the human operators/monitors of the 
technology.  For Part 121 operations this will 
include the safety considerations of evolving 
flight crew and ATM integration.  Not all 
hazards associated with such operations will 
necessarily be revealed by traditional 
“functional” approaches.  Hence, the proposed 
hybrid approach incorporates the best features 
of multi-disciplinary brainstorm teams with 
systematic consideration of Areas of Change 
affecting the future aviation system. 
Not all past safety concerns may 
necessarily be relevant in future operational 
environments.  There is a very real danger in 
apparent certainties in assessment of the 
significance of traditionally important causal 
factors of aviation accidents revealed by pure 
functional hazard assessment.  Many historic 
safety concerns are now statistically 
insignificant in certain geographic areas.  We 
must not relax our vigilance especially in those 
emergent domains where human performance 
will remain an essential ingredient for system 
safety. This vigilance demands that all available 
hazard identification methods be brought to bear 
on the novel operational concepts of the future. 
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